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Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
Although economic factors have proven to be crucial factors influencing the conflict proneness of a 
country, both military cease fires and peace agreements tend to neglect the economic and socio-
economic aspects of war, while emphasizing mainly political and military issues. However, 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention measures applied by the international community cannot limit 
themselves to ending open violence and cutting conflict profiteers from their power and income. In 
addition, alternative social, economic and political structures must be fostered to allow the 
population to meet their basic needs outside the structures of violent conflict. The establishment of 
relevant economic structures and the creation of an attractive investment climate for foreign 
investments are crucial for breaking and transforming the destructive structures of economies of 
violence. 
Obwohl wirtschaftliche Faktoren einen bedeutenden Einfluss auf das Konfliktpotential eines Landes 
haben, kommen in Waffenstillstands- und Friedensabkommen wirtschaftliche und sozio-
ökonomische Aspekte von Kriegen gegenüber politischen und militärischen Aspekten oft zu kurz. 
Massnahmen der internationalen Gemeinschaft sollten sich jedoch nicht nur darauf konzentrieren, 
offene Gewalt zu beenden und die Macht und Einkünfte von Konfliktprofiteuren zu beschneiden, 
sondern darauf achten, dass zusätzlich soziale, wirtschaftliche und politische Strukturen gefördert 
werden, mit deren Hilfe die Bevölkerung ihre Grundbedürfnisse ausserhalb der vom Gewaltkonflikt 
geprägten Strukturen befriedigen kann. Der Aufbau entsprechender wirtschaftlicher Strukturen und 
die Schaffung eines attraktiven Investitionsklimas sind wichtige Voraussetzungen, um die 
zerstörerischen Strukturen von Gewaltökonomien zu durchbrechen und zu im positiven Sinne zu 
verändern. 
Bien qu’il soit reconnu que les facteurs économiques ont une influence importante sur la probabilité 
d’un conflit armé, les aspects économiques et socio-économiques des guerres sont souvent négligés 
lors de l’établissement de trêves militaires et d’accords de paix. L’accent est plus souvent mis sur les 
aspects militaires et politiques. Cependant, les mesures de la promotion de paix et la prévention de 
conflit mises en œuvre par la communauté internationale ne doivent pas se limiter à arrêter le conflit 
armé et à éliminer le pouvoir et les revenus des profiteurs de guerre. La communauté internationale 
devrait encourager l’aménagement de structures sociales, économiques et politiques, afin de 
permettre à la population de satisfaire ses besoins élémentaires à l'extérieur des structures 
marquées par le conflit violent. L’établissement de structures économiques adéquates et la création 
d'un climat d'investissement attractif sont des conditions importantes afin de changer la dynamique 
destructrice des économies de guerre en une dynamique positive.  
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1 Preface 
Walter Fust 
Sustainable development and durable peace are built on solid economic, socio-cultural and political 
institutions. International cooperation must strive for long-term peacebuilding, thus recognizing the 
roots of violent conflict and investing in structures and processes that support the peaceful 
management of social and resource conflicts. 
Once conflicts have escalated and are marked by a fatal dynamic of their own, a vicious circle of 
violence emerges. Persisting conditions of de facto wars with changing sources of volatility are 
causes of immense human and material costs. Armed violence and loss of political and social 
stability alter a country’s long-term economic survival. For instance, due to extensive use of 
landmines, large areas can no longer be farmed; the production of goods, services, and trade is 
severely hampered; and new and illegal activities flourish, such as delivery services for armed 
groups, arms smuggling, forced prostitution and organized crime.  
War does not only affect the economy – the economy by itself is transformed into a war economy, 
infiltrating effectively and continuously peace economies and related societal and political 
institutions.   
Anchored in local exploitation of lootable natural resources, war economies primarily serve the 
personal interests of warlords and their protagonists. They do so through global marketing channels. 
The basis of their power is war and the profit they derive from it. This allows them to establish 
patronage over their clients. Ultimately they have no interest in peace. At the same time, 
internationally established and highly efficient criminal networks crop up in their wake. They 
orchestrate political chaos in order to maintain a lavishly supplied shadow economy. The ensuing 
privatization of the state's monopoly over the use of force, along with the criminalization of business 
and illicit trade, represent a complex challenge for those actors who – along with international 
partners committed to building peace and combating poverty – use nonviolent measures to 
strengthen rule of law and government legitimacy.  
Particularly susceptible to war are societies with widespread poverty, extreme and growing socio-
economic disparities, wealth in raw materials, a lack of future opportunities and personal freedom, 
and a lack of legitimate and credible institutions for conflict transformation. Economic growth – 
often praised as a key poverty reduction measure – is not capable of slowing down conflict 
escalation and can even have a destabilizing effect by strengthening existing asymmetries, unless 
accompanied by equity measures. Often weak states and unstable societies cannot cope with the 
challenges of rapid economic and social change without outbreaks of violence. Moreover, 
development and transition processes, both economic and political, can change power relationships, 
causing crises to emerge within society and leading to an acute loss of cultural identity and social 
cohesion.  
The search for causes alone will be futile if the various actors and their positions, as well as the 
dynamics, triggering events, and external factors of conflict escalation are not understood properly. 
Our goal should be less on finding rapid solutions for violent conflicts than on transforming systems 
of conflict in such a way that rival parties and the affected population find sustainable solutions to 
their conflicts without resort to violence. Alternative social, economic and political institutions must 
be established or revived, allowing the society to satisfy its basic needs outside the remnant 
structures of violent conflicts and the vicious cycle of war economies and criminal violence. 
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2 Introduction 
Danielle Lalive d’Epinay and Albrecht Schnabel 
In the study of protracted violent conflicts, the focus has increasingly shifted away from primarily 
trying to define the root causes of conflict to determining the factors that sustain violence and are 
thus partly responsible for the long duration of conflicts and their relapse into violence. In the 1990s, 
conflict analysis was confronted with conflict dynamics for which traditional approaches did no 
longer seem to provide useful explanations. The long duration of intrastate conflicts, the variety and 
frequent change of combatant parties involved and the complex role of international entanglements 
in conflict dynamics called for new approaches. The analysis of the economic agendas of combatant 
parties showed that in these protracted violent conflicts, the economic interests of warring parties 
were crucial to a proper understanding of conflict dynamics, their often long duration and frequent 
relapses.  
Certain economic structures either contribute to the creation of violence and/or emerge through 
armed conflict. They lead to and feed off violence, are consolidated as the conflict continues and 
continue to be in place long after open violence has been bought to an end. This is partly due to the 
fact that the combatant parties often profit directly or indirectly from the conflict. The latter allows 
them to maintain political power and to consolidate or expand their control over valuable assets or 
lucrative resources of the country, and to continue their control of black markets and informal 
market segments and national, regional or even international trading networks. These actors are not 
interested in preventing or transforming such “War Economies” or “Economies of Violence”, as they 
help them generate income through systematically organized violence.   
In war economies, not only conflict profiteers but also large parts of the population unwillingly 
depend on the economic structures that generate – and are generated by – violence. Even though 
they do not directly gain financial profit from economies of violence, they depend on them for their 
daily income and survival, even after the end of a conflict. Peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
measures applied by the international community cannot limit themselves to merely ending open 
violence or cutting the conflict profiteers off their power and income. If wider socio-economic 
impacts of transforming economic structures are not taken into account, transformation towards a 
peace economy is not sustainable. 
Especially during the transition phase from the end of open violence to the consolidation of peace, 
the establishment of economic structures and the creation of an attractive climate for foreign 
investments are crucial for breaking and transforming the destructive structures of economies of 
violence. While economic factors have proven to be crucial factors influencing the conflict proneness 
of a country, military cease fires and peace agreements tend to neglect the economic and socio-
economic aspects of war, while emphasizing mainly political and military issues. 
One central characteristic of economies of violence is their dependence on the international 
economic and financial system. Flows of trade and finance to and from economies of violence are 
only profitable if they have access to the legal infrastructure of international economic exchange. To 
tackle the problems of transforming the economic structures in an economy of violence, efforts must 
therefore not only target local shortcomings but also focus on the role of international players.  
In September 2004, swisspeace and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
organized a conference on “Transforming War Economies”. The conference offered an opportunity 
to discuss options and strategies for government actors – especially Foreign Ministry and 
Development Cooperation offices –, civil society organizations and the academic community to 
contribute to the sustainable transformation of War Economies, through local, national and 
international activities. Discussions focused on options to cut conflict profiteers off their violence-
related income, and on the challenge of establishing alternative economic structures that allow the 
wider population to meet their needs without depending on activities that support – and are 
supported by – violence. The proceedings of this conference were published as an internal report. In 
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addition, we felt that that some of the formal presentations should be shared with a wider audience. 
We thus asked a selected number of speakers for written contributions based on their September 
2004 presentations, whose messages hold true today as they did when they were originally 
conceived. These essays are featured in this working paper.  
In the preface, Walter Fust calls for more efforts to base peacebuilding strategies on a thorough 
understanding of the root causes of violent conflict. He points to the need for strengthening good 
governance and non-violent conflict transformation in unstable societies fraught by social and 
resource conflicts. In his essay entitled “Civil War, War Economies and International Cooperation”, 
Paul Collier argues that there are no mono-causal explanations for civil war, but that a multitude of 
risk factors determine a country’s proneness to hazard. The three most salient factors, however, tend 
to be economic ones – low level of income, low growth rate of income, and dependence on primary 
commodities. This combination of factors characterizes many African countries in particular. Besides 
the difficulty of enforcing settlements, yet another economic factor drives the long duration of civil 
wars: financial interests and capital develop in and around conflicts and, in turn, sustain them quite 
effectively. Collier discusses two main sources of such finance: natural resources and diasporas. In 
addition to facilitated settlements along with military guarantees, he calls for “a financial strategy 
for squeezing rebel groups of their finances and making governments use their revenues more 
transparently”. Post-conflict societies, about half of which relapse into war partly due to economic 
interests in the continuation of violence and chaos, should be prioritized in the fight to eradicate war 
economies. Yet, economic policies do not match the requirements of post-conflict situations: While 
we “should prioritize social policies first, then structural-, and finally macro policies” – the prevailing 
approach by the IMF, World Bank and UN, for instance, is the other way around. As well, aid needs 
to be provided more evenly across the first post-war decade, not massively at the beginning, with 
little to follow after the first couple of years. In preventing future civil wars, particularly the bottom 
one billion people must be assisted with a combination of aid, trade, security and improved 
governance. 
Gabi Hesselbein discusses “The Economics of ‘Failed States’ in Sub-Saharan Africa”. War economies 
are linked to failing/failed states through economic structures that are characterized by an 
overwhelming agrarian sector, shrinking state resources, weak and fragile state institutions, and 
powerful business actors. She concludes that “[t]he monopoly of power and taxation must be 
restored. Political and administrative control must be exercised over the entire state territory. 
Economic development has to be pushed through a more intensive division of labor, though 
technical progress and a focus on added value. This all relies on a relatively stable and peaceful 
environment, which will be facilitated by cooperation among elite-members, power-sharing or 
income-sharing”. This will help in preventing economic problems from turning into war economies.  
In her thoughts on “Business and Conflict – Options and Instruments for Government Actors”, 
Jessica Banfield draws on her work for International Alert’s Business and Conflict Programme. 
Northern governments, alone and together via regional or international organizations, have an 
important part to play in fostering conflict-sensitive business behavior at home and in-country. 
Particularly the UN, OECD, international financial institutions and the EU are important vehicles for 
the transfer of best practices into peacebuilding activities. Urs Egger focuses on “The Role of Local 
Business Actors in Creating New Livelihoods”, drawing on the experience of Swisscontact in Eastern 
Sri Lanka. He argues that development cooperation should support and promote local initiatives 
without attempting to be the driving force. Moreover, it must avoid creating parallel administrative 
structures and invest in human resource development alongside rehabilitation efforts and 
investment. This creates a conducive environment for a stronger and sustainable local economy in 
former conflict zones.  
In their essay “Investing in Stability and Sustainability: How can we Engage the Financial Sector in 
Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding?”, Jason Switzer and Mareike Hussels take a closer look at 
the role of finance in conflict escalation and peacebuilding. They identify a number of key 
Transforming War Economies 
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requirements that help reduce the finance sector’s destructive role and increase its constructive 
influence on societies in conflict: On the one had it is important to reduce financial flows that 
support violence, and to reduce macroeconomic and local vulnerability to commodity price 
fluctuations. On the other hand it is important to strengthen conflict sensitivity through innovative 
products and services, particularly in post-conflict societies. Moreover, it is crucial to integrate 
conflict sensitivity into project finance, for instance in the case of extractive sector projects. They 
conclude that, “to be an effective actor in preventing conflict and building peace, the aid community 
must learn how to nurture local financial institutions and how to make international ones more 
accountable for their actions”.  
Investing in the transformation of war economies into peace economies is an important contribution 
to both conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. As a result of this initial engagement 
with this subject, swisspeace decided to firmly anchor the analysis of economic activities in violent 
conflicts and peace processes within its project on Business and Peace 
(http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/business-peace/index.html). 
Civil War, War Economies and International Cooperation 
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3 Civil War, War Economies and International 
Cooperation 
Paul Collier 
We often refer to “causes of conflict.” However, I have given up on using the word “causes.” 
Despite nearly one hundred years of research, historians still cannot agree on what caused World 
War One – a fairly simple event compared to most civil wars. Civil wars have a vast array of causes, 
which can be better expressed by the language of “proneness.” For instance, tracing conflicts back 
to a misdeed in the 14th century is not very helpful. One can probably always trace a conflict back to 
something that happened in the 14th century – simply for the reason that, anywhere in the world, if 
one looks back to the 14th century, one would find that this was a mostly violent and dreadful 
century. Most of the world has managed to get beyond that. Similarly, there is little if any evidence 
for the argument that civil wars are based on ethnic hatreds. Of course, in ethnically diverse societies 
where there are conflicts, communities will inevitably organize and divide – and often fight – along 
ethnic lines. Such conflicts will be ethnically patterned. However, this is different from arguing that 
they are ethnically caused – a step that is unfortunately taken much too fast. Globally, evidence 
shows that ethnically diverse societies are no more dangerous than ethnically homogenous societies. 
3.1 Conflict Proneness Factors 
Falling into a civil war is somewhat analogous to falling sick. There are multiple risk factors that 
make one more or less prone to a hazard. What are some of the main proneness or risk factors? 
According to my own research, the three most salient factors are all economic ones. That is of course 
not to say that economics cause civil war, but that they are significant risk factors. Those risk factors 
are low level of income, low growth rate of income, and dependence on primary commodities, 
especially natural resources. A community stricken by all three of those risk factors is extremely 
poor, in economic decline and dependent on natural resources – and thus at high risk of conflict. 
These characteristics describe the situation in much of Africa: Extreme poverty, economic decline, 
and natural resource dependence. If one consults statistical data, one will quickly realize why Africa 
suffers from more conflicts than many other regions, and why the incidence of conflict has risen in 
Africa, while it has fallen anywhere else. Of course, this is not to suggest that there is a mechanistic 
and simplistic cause explaining violent conflicts in Africa – but a set of identifiable factors of conflict 
proneness. If all the proximate factors that cause conflicts – for instance the emergence of a 
charismatic rebel leader or a government that makes a crucial mistake – happen in an environment 
with much higher per capita income, rapid growth, and a more diversified economy, that society will 
probably cope with these events, without escalating to large-scale violence. 
3.2 Duration of Violent Conflict 
A most striking feature of civil wars is how long they last. On average, they tend to last more than 
ten times as long as international wars. An extreme case in point is the conflict between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, which played out twice, once as a civil war and once as an international war. As a civil 
war the conflict lasted more than 30 years, while as an international war it lasted less than 30 days.  
Why do civil wars last such a long time? Two factors are particularly relevant in this context: First, it 
is very hard to log into existing frameworks to reach the settlement of a civil war. There has been no 
system enforcing the terms of a settlement, whereas in the case of international war, we have over 
the centuries developed ways and means of reaching treaties, as well as of enforcing them. If one 
cannot enforce a settlement in civil wars, there is little utility in arriving at one, as nobody puts much 
faith into the negotiations. However, in this case the world has begun to learn. Especially during the 
past few years there has been movement in deploying the techniques of international diplomacy at 
the level of internal conflict, with a considerable degree of success. The number of civil wars is 
declining sharply, which bears testimony to the very high pay-offs of increasing efforts of negotiation 
and increasing efforts to guarantee settlements.  
Transforming War Economies 
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The second reason why civil wars last so long is an economic reason: Over time civil wars become 
self-sustaining businesses. Interests and capital develop that specialize in conflict – generating huge 
stocks of armaments and organizations that are basically protection agencies securing access to and 
control of lucrative resources. This is not to say that civil war is primarily motivated by finance – 
sometimes it is, sometimes it is not. However, it is – and certainly has to be – sustained by finance. 
If it is not sustained by finance it stops, as war is very expensive. Thus, one further way to shorten 
conflicts is to try and squeeze the finances that sustain them. 
3.3 Sources of Finance 
In any given conflict there are always multiple sources of finance. I will highlight two of them:  One 
concerns natural resources and the other funding from diasporas. Natural resources are an important 
source of finance to rebel groups. They are also an important source of misgovernance on the part of 
many governments. Knowing that, the international community is developing a two-pronged effort 
to try and clean up these natural resource revenues. One such effort is to try and cut the access of 
rebel groups to natural resource revenues, for instance through the Kimberly Process on diamonds. 
Similar approaches are developed to cover timber and, possibly, oil, gas, and financial flows. For 
instance, in Nigeria one billion dollars a year in Nigerian oil is stolen and sold by very powerful and 
violent large-scale criminal gangs with contacts to the political establishment. If trace materials were 
put in that oil, it would become counterfeit material, its value would decrease sharply and it would 
become far less attractive loot for rebel groups. While adding trace substances might be difficult, it is 
not impossible. For example, China has a very strong interest in a stable Africa, because China sees 
Africa as a future source of raw materials. Therefore, initiatives like the Kimberly Process and its 
successors on timber and perhaps oil are a way of cutting rebel groups out of financial resources, 
thus limiting their capacity to fare war. 
On the other hand, one needs to clean up government use of natural resource revenues. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a promising start in the right direction: A great 
success since its launch by the British government several years ago, it has now been picked up, 
promoted and implemented by the government of Nigeria. This is a tremendous achievement. In a 
recent meeting of seven West African oil producers, the Nigerians forged the way, insisting that 
West Africa clean up its management of oil revenues and make it more transparent, visibly shocking 
some of the other governments. This serves as an example of an international effort that, had it not 
existed, the Nigerian reformers could not have picked up. In terms of natural resources we now have 
international strategies both to cut revenues out of rebel groups and make government access to 
such revenues more transparent.  
The diaspora represents a further significant source of revenues to rebel groups. For example, Tamils 
in the West, especially in North America, are financing the Tamil Tigers; Albanians in Europe have 
financed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); and the Irish in North America have been financing the 
IRA. These problems have gradually and belatedly been realized, leading to increased monitoring of 
diaspora organizations and the realization that it is our responsibility to curtail organized funding of 
violence in other societies, which originates in our societies. A devastating bomb attack in Colombo 
a few years ago – with almost the destructive power of the September 11 disaster – was financed by 
Tamils in Canada. Yet, no OECD society is eager to go through the trouble of curtailing diaspora 
organizations, as the violence does not tend to occur in our societies. 
In summary, to shorten the duration of conflict we need a combination of facilitating settlements – 
which is an international diplomatic activity that should include military guarantees for settlements – 
and a financial strategy for squeezing rebel groups of their finances and making governments use 
their revenues more transparently. 
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3.4 Post-conflict Societies 
Post-conflict societies offer opportunities to improve our performance in preventing war economies. 
Approximately half of all civil wars are post-conflict relapses, i.e. post-conflict situations that have 
gone wrong. There is an approximately 50 percent chance – thus, a very high risk – that post-conflict 
situations relapse into open violence. This fact alone is evidence enough that we could do much 
better in stabilizing post-conflict societies.  
Why are post-conflict societies at such high risk to return to war? Partly this is due to the fact that 
they represent societies that are inherently at risk – which might have been the reason why violence 
broke out in the first place. Moreover, the experience of violent conflict generates new divisions, 
new hatreds, and new potential for future conflict. Of the approximately 50 percent which slide back 
into conflict, half of them do so over reasons that existed before the original conflict, the other half 
over reasons generated during that conflict. What are some of the conflictive forces that are 
generated during a conflict? These are mainly the economic interests mentioned above: During an 
armed conflict some groups emerge, which can only – and quite well – live by violence. They have 
no interest in peace and emerge as political spoilers of any peace settlement.  
We can oppose these forces with economic, political, and military instruments. Economic 
instruments take time. As I argued above, the main proneness factors for conflict are indeed 
economic in nature. If economic problems can be solved, the proneness to violence and risk of 
conflict would be reduced. However, there are no quick fixes, and it takes at least a decade before 
economic recovery reaches the point where it effectively reduces the risk of conflict recurrence in 
post-conflict societies. How then does one survive this first post-conflict decade when the risks of 
relapse are that high? The answer does not lie in economic recovery but, in the first instance, in 
political solutions. However, we tend to be over-reliant and over-confident in the power of political 
solutions for short-term fixes during this first decade. Unfortunately, the standard political design 
package still tends to be to get to elections as quickly as possible, despite sufficient statistical 
evidence that elections in post conflict-situations are not actually reducing risks. In fact, the second 
post-conflict election actually tends to push risks up. Of course, this does not mean that elections 
should not be held, but it is to say that one should not rely on them as the ultimate solution for 
bringing peace, at least in the short term. There is also evidence that – if anything – in low-income 
countries democracy itself raises risks of conflict rather than reduces them. Again, this is not to say 
that one should not hold elections in low-income countries. Obviously, much good can arise from 
democratization – and thus also electoral – processes. However, we should not delude ourselves 
into thinking that by installing a democratic constitutional design into a post-conflict country we will 
solve the peace process. This is by far not the case. In the short term, even the cleverest, fairest and 
best political design is new. And because it is new, it is contestable. As there are spoilers in any 
post-conflict society who do not want peace to succeed, they will contest it. Thus, even political 
processes will not able to perform miracles in the short term.  
The first post-conflict decade requires a strong military presence, which should evolve according to 
different levels of risk and, thus, types of security measures. This requires a gradual transition from 
military to police. Typically, the domestic post-conflict government itself provides much of the 
military effort, generating a level of military expenditure that often equals that of the war period. In 
post-conflict situations governments tend to respond to high risk with high military spending, seeing 
it as a deterrent. Unfortunately, rather than being an effective deterrent, evidence shows that, while 
outside of post-conflict situations high military spending does not raise the risk of conflict, within 
this post-conflict decade, high military spending does. While the instinctive response of post-conflict 
governments is therefore counterproductive to the peace process, there is still a need for military 
assistance during that decade. This only leaves us with the option of an external military presence. In 
terms of who should provide such military presence, one could think in terms of subsidiarity, 
drawing on the lowest level that is competent to do the job. Thus, if a regional organization or a 
sub-regional organization can supply the required police or military forces, they should do so. If not, 
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one needs to involve the United Nations or rely on bilateral assistance (such as in the case of UK 
forces in Sierra Leone). It is important that, whoever puts troops in a post-conflict theater, must be 
willing to take the risk of casualties. In the case of UN forces, there is a tendency that contributing 
governments are not willing to see “their” troops engaged in military action. The result is very low 
credibility peacekeeping. Sierra Leone is again a good example: Before the deployment of British 
troops, United Nations peacekeeping troops present in the country were not willing or did not have 
the rules, mandate or incentives to engage in recurring violence. In the end, 500 UN troops were 
kidnapped by rebel forces that then took their guns, turning UN peacekeepers into a source of 
armaments for the rebels.  
A few further comments are in order about economic instruments in recovery. During the war we 
experience massive capital flight, as the population tries to move their assets abroad. Getting these 
assets back in the country is a major and important challenge during the post-conflict period. Two 
issues are decisive in this context: Property rights and the reduction of risks. Property rights are 
usually highly contested in post-conflict situations, when opportunism reigns: Property rights are 
confused and opportunists abuse this confusion to claim property that does not belong to them. It is 
thus extremely important to address property rights. An instructive example is Uganda: The 
government set up a commission that judicated submitted property claims. If claims were not 
submitted by a certain date, no future claims were possible. On the other hand, the case of Ethiopia 
shows how this should not be done – the government of Ethiopia simply went into denial that there 
was a problem and did not take any measures.  
In typical post-conflict situations, economic policies start very badly and typically improve greatly 
over the first post-conflict decade. This period offers plenty of opportunities to embark on economic 
policy reform, because vested interests have been broken up and the population expects change. 
Yet, such reform is usually not a priority in the immediate post-conflict period, for the first two or 
three years. The government is busy with other, seemingly more urgent, issues, while this would be 
the right moment to jump-start reforms. However, often there is confusion about which reforms one 
should tackle first. In a course on post-conflict economics, which I have been offering to staff 
members of the World Bank, the IMF and the UN, I asked them to prioritize between macro-, 
structural and social policies. I asked them to imagine that they are going to two extremely poor 
countries with weak policies – one of them in the post-conflict phase, the other not. Should this 
distinction affect one’s policy priorities? Staff members from the IMF tended to argue in favor of 
macro-, those from the World Bank for structural-, and those from the UN for social policies. From 
that experience I learned that policy priorities largely depend on which international team of experts 
arrives first. The IMF tends to send in their team immediately, the World Bank arrives after about 
four weeks, and about six months later the UN team arrives. Unfortunately, econometric evidence 
tells us that this is not a particularly useful sequence of reform priorities: If we want to generate 
economic growth in post-conflict situations, we should prioritize social policies first, then structural-, 
and finally macro policies. Thus, the present and prevalent policy advice is not helpful at all. 
3.5 Aid 
How much aid should be provided and when? Evidence suggests that aid that facilitates growth is 
much more effective in post-conflict situations than in other situations. Over the first post-conflict 
decade, aid should be considerably higher than for an equivalent country that is not at the post-
conflict stage, particularly for the purpose of generating growth and stimulating poverty reduction. 
However, historically, that has not been the case. Aid tends to arrive in a flood during the first 
couple of years after a peace settlement and then tapers off. Unfortunately, econometric evidence 
shows that aid is contributing most to the growth process in the middle of the decade, not the 
beginning. In the beginning there are multiple needs, but without absorptive capacity. What would 
be required is a tapering in during the first half of the decade and then a tapering to normal by the 
end of the decade. Once understood, this should be a relatively easy problem to fix.
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3.6 Conflict Prevention 
I will conclude with some remarks on economic policy in conflict prevention. One can conceptualize 
the development problem in a very old fashioned way: Today’s world is populated by five billion 
poor and one billion rich people. In the future, the five billion in developing countries will be divided 
into a large group that is more or less succeeding on the development path – China and India being 
the most obvious examples – and a group of one billion people at the bottom, in the most 
marginalized countries that are not simply in relative but absolute decline. In 10-15 years, we will be 
addressing the development problem more or less in the context of these one billion at the bottom. 
To meet this task we require more than just aid, including a wider range of instruments. We require 
policy coherence between trade policy (where we have made a very slow start) and security policy 
(where we have to be in a position of rapid provision of external militaries, both in post-conflict 
situations and pre-emptively). For instance, the international community could offer countries 
military assistance against coups or other internal threats in return for strict adherence to certain 
standards of governance. One of the largest threats to human security in Africa is not rebellion or 
elections, but coups. Anything that guarantees security from a nation’s own military, will be 
welcome in African societies – and by their governments. Thus, addressing the bottom one billion 
people will require aid, trade, security and, finally, decent governance. 
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4 The Economies of “Failed States” in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Gabi Hesselbein 
War economies are one result of state failure. Transforming war economies requires the re-
establishment of the state. In my contribution to this working paper I will focus on similarities 
between failing or failed states and war economies, particularly with respect to four related aspects: 
The economic structure; state resources; state institutions; and business actors. I will then offer some 
basic steps that could be taken to re-establish functioning states. 
4.1 The Economic Structure 
From an economic point of view, failed states and war economies can be characterized as follows: 
First, there is a huge agrarian sector that basically serves subsistence needs, i.e. people do not farm 
in the first place to market their products but to sustain their living. The very low level of productivity 
hardly allows for surplus. Between 70 and 90 percent of Africa’s population rely on this agrarian 
sector for survival. Secondly, some export earnings come from the cash-crop sector. Although not 
always the case, productivity in this sector can be higher. However, there is almost no value added, 
as processing is virtually non-existent. Earnings from this sector have been sharply declining in most 
African states. And thirdly, a further contribution to export earnings comes from mineral primary 
goods such as diamonds, coltan or gold. Again, there is little if no processing, just simple extraction 
from what the land provides. 
Industry is almost non-existent, and the service sector is characterized by its low value added. In 
many, if not all African countries the entire economy is run on extremely low levels of productivity: 
Only very few companies are involved in the extraction and sale of primary commodities, and their 
technical base is simple, with little relevant value added. An increase of production is usually not 
achieved by more intensive production, but by an extension of the area under cultivation. However, 
given the land scarcity in almost all African countries, the latter can itself develop into a source of 
conflict. 
4.2 State Ressources 
The economic structure is reflected in the state budget and thus limits government actions. The main 
source of income for the state is taxes on international trade. Although many efforts have been 
undertaken to expand the tax base through company taxation, individual taxes or taxes on goods 
and services, and although these revenues vary greatly across African budgets, the overwhelming 
revenue relies on the taxation of international trade. Official development aid and grants also play 
an important role, but African states are more often than not limited in their decisions as to how and 
for which purposes they are allowed to spend those funds. 
With very few exceptions – such as “successful developers” like Botswana – since the 1980s state 
revenues are declining considerably in most African states. Massive economic and financial shocks 
affected the budgets, making it increasingly difficult for governments to fulfill even simple 
responsibilities towards their citizens. Policing, schooling or health-care deteriorated, increasing the 
suffering of the population, which, in turn, questioned the legitimacy of their government. The 
erosion of the state’s ability to “deliver” led to an erosion of the state itself. 
What remains – and is thriving – are conflicts about the distribution of what little is left. Once these 
conflicts turn violent, the state budget finally collapses. This tends to be followed by the (violent) 
usurpation of resources through local or regional groups. 
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4.3 State Institutions 
In African states, state institutions in general are weak and fragile, although some pomp and display 
of strength sometimes seems to indicate the opposite. In failed or failing states, as well as in war 
economies, we find that “modern” rules and regulations co-exist with older settings of law, written 
or unwritten. This is particularly true in the realm of land ownership, which is generally based on 
inherited collective law, and it is also true when the legitimacy to rule is questioned. A modern 
constitution or a modern parliament does not necessarily mean that chiefs, emirs, local, regional or 
religious leaders cease to be in power. 
In war economies, violence against “others” goes hand in hand with rules that have to be observed 
within the “own” group. The elites are relatively small groups and consist of only few people who 
serve – according to status – as minister, head of state, university professor, chief, rebel leader or 
warlord. 
4.4 Business Actors 
Private business actors (or even managers of parastatal structures), of which there are only few, 
generally wield considerable power within society. They enjoy access to both state and military 
power. This power tends to be used in two ways: On the one hand, earnings from the mineral or 
cash-crop sector are used to extend or stabilize the military power and level of violence in favor of 
one’s own group. In this case resources are fuelling conflict. On the other hand, resources are used 
to expand one’s economic position without resort to force, as the societal status allows for that. This 
might fuel economic growth. 
In both cases the resources base in a given country is the same. Diamonds in Botswana serve 
economic development, diamonds in Sierra Leone finance war. The main difference is whether they 
are formally extracted and appropriated, or if this is done through the use of force for the benefit of 
a particular violent group. 
4.5 Basic Steps 
The difficulties inherent in ending violence and pursuing disarmament should by no means be 
belittled or underestimated. These are huge tasks by themselves. However, given the striking 
similarities between failing or failed states and war economies as far as economic and power 
structures are concerned, a number of steps, among others, must be taken to overcome these 
outrageous obstacles for human development: The monopoly of power and taxation must be 
restored; political and administrative control must be exercised over the entire state territory; and 
economic development has to be pushed with a more intensive division of labor, technical progress 
and a focus on value added. All of these steps rely on a relatively stable and peaceful environment, 
which will be facilitated by cooperation among the elite, power-sharing, or income-sharing. 
Although this is easier said than done, it needs to be done. When war economies become an answer 
to economic problems, all actors involved need to work for better solutions that generate more 
surplus, more benefits and better options for millions of people. 
Transforming War Economies 
14 
5 Business and Conflict – Options and Instruments 
for Government Actors 
Jessica Banfield 
While the issue of war economies is vast, the following comments will focus on the role of 
multinational companies investing in conflict-affected countries, based on the peacebuilding NGO 
International Alert’s (IA) broader programme of work on business and conflict.  
During the most recent years, the issue of business in conflict zones has focused on both corporate 
social responsibility and humanitarian agendas, generating several international policy initiatives, 
numerous publications by NGOs and research institutions, and both private and public sector 
conferences and events. International Alert’s “Business and Conflict Programme” targets a diverse 
group of actors: business leaders in conflict countries; companies that invest in conflict-prone 
countries; donor governments and multilaterals; and peacebuilding practitioners. The programme 
aims to contribute to conflict prevention and transformation through engagement with economic 
actors and issues.  
After two years of research and development, the report Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: 
Guidance for Extractive Industries was published in early 2005 by International Alert 
(http://www.international-alert.org/publications/234.php). The work was funded by Foreign Affairs 
Canada, UK Department for International Development, Swedish SIDA and the human rights division 
of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. It includes a foreword from former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan. CSBP was developed with input from some of the world’s leading extractive 
industry companies and conflict experts. It is meant to provide corporate managers with a better 
understanding of the impact of their own operations on violent conflict, and it offers a number of 
tools that can be used to mitigate such impact.  
The incentives for companies to think more carefully about their conduct in conflict zones can be 
based on the company’s own appreciation of the various costs imposed on business by conflict 
(increases in security, insurance, and capital costs; opportunity costs; and legal and reputational 
risk). Globalized networks of civil society and the media play their role in keeping the spotlight on 
multinationals operating abroad, and on the impact of their operations on the livelihoods and 
security of local people.  
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) offers a definition of ‘fragile states’ as those 
that ‘cannot or will not manage the resources at their disposal for the benefit of the majority of its 
populations’. Such states are often conflict-prone – and in these environments, the overall benefits 
of foreign investment can be complex. The conduct and operating practice of multinational 
companies – decisions relating to distribution of employment opportunities, security arrangements, 
environmental impact, and relationships with political elites for example – can all exacerbate or act 
as a trigger to underlying tensions in society. In such contexts it becomes all the more important for 
‘home’ governments and international organizations to clarify appropriate standards of behavior and 
to hold companies that flout these to account. Thus, governments clearly have an important role to 
play. 
5.1 National Policy Priorities 
Northern governments play an important role in this process, as they can help to:  
• strengthen legal accountability;  
• ensure implementation of key standards (such as the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights, or OECD Guidelines for MNEs); 
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• ensure that state-backed investment (such as Export Credit Agencies, Public Private 
Partnerships, funds) are ‘conflict-sensitive’; 
• promote best practices (at home and in-country); 
• support the capacity of developing country governments to manage natural 
resource exploitation effectively and for the benefit of local people. 
Northern governments can take a much more active role than is currently the case to promote best 
practices both at home and in-country. This would enhance conflict-sensitive business behavior 
through dialogue, awareness-raising and the promotion of such simple steps as mandatory 
registration for companies that operate in conflict-prone zones. Where their home companies are 
accused of complicity in war crimes or other abuses – as has been the case through the Alien Torts 
Claims Act or through complaints brought to the attention of OECD ‘National Contact Points’ – 
governments should take all possible steps to investigate and address such concerns. Doing so 
would send a strong signal to business that investing in conflict zones must be managed with care 
and integrity. Greater synergy between development and trade/investment ministries is required to 
ensure that promotion of national business interests does not undermine development goals. 
5.2 International Policy Priorities 
At present no overarching internationally agreed convention or standard exists regarding companies’ 
roles in conflict zones. The absence of clear guidance and rules becomes apparent time and again as 
companies and civil society actors alike face uncertainty as to the appropriate responses to 
challenging interactions between companies and conflict actors and dynamics. 
The UN has played an important role in promoting certification and sanction regimes on certain 
conflict commodities and, through the UN Global Compact and work of the High Commission on 
Human Rights, in developing the UN Draft Norms on Responsibilities of Business, in contributing to 
the emergence of a new normative framework for doing business in conflict affected countries. The 
UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights could become a focal point for much-
needed coordinated international action on this issue.  
The OECD Guidelines for MNEs have featured in civil society-led debates about company conduct in 
conflict zones, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is an important source of guidance 
given the widespread application of the OECD Guidelines. Unfortunately, the text of the Guidelines 
itself has little to say about the intersection between business and human rights or conflict, and 
clarification in this regard is urgently needed. 
International Financial Institutions have an important role to play in promoting better governance of 
natural resource exploitation at the domestic level and, through development banks, in promoting 
higher standards of conflict-sensitivity among companies and project financiers. 
While the EU has shown a commitment to addressing trade in specific conflict commodities (e.g. 
diamonds and timber), it has done little on the issue of company conduct in conflict zones, despite a 
clear statement in its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention of the importance of European 
companies contributing to conflict prevention and peace. Greater coordination is required between 
relevant EU institutions and actors in order to develop EU-wide standards and guidance for 
companies. 
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6 The Role of Local Business Actors in Creating New 
Livelihoods 
Urs Egger 
6.1 When Can We Really Talk of a “Post-Conflict Situation”? 
A civil war does not simply end when a ceasefire or a peace agreement is signed at Track I level. It is 
never completely clear if an agreement was signed with a genuine commitment to peace in the first 
place. Often, low-scale warfare or covert interventions continue. Different armed groups might 
become more active in a perceived power vacuum, mistrust and hatred among the communities still 
persist, the situation is still tense and even a vague rumor might spark and spiral into violence. 
6.2 What Do We Mean When We Talk of a Post-Conflict Situation? 
The observations below are based on examples from Sri Lanka, where Swisscontact has been 
working since 1981. At the time of writing (2004/05), a formal cease-fire agreement had been in 
force since the beginning of 2002. However, at Track I level, the negotiations had been stalled. 
Political stalemates made it difficult for the present minority government to move forward with the 
peace process while a split within the LTTE had led to an armed standoff between the two factions. 
These factors influenced the peace process on the national level as well as the local level. In Eastern 
Sri Lanka, the situation was tense and overall the country had again moved away from a sustainable 
peace. When we face a post-conflict situation in places like Congo, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, or even Iraq, 
we have to keep in mind that these are very fragile and largely unpredictable situations where 
violence has not stopped entirely and conflict can easily and suddenly resume.  
In the following, I will outline some of the constraints and opportunities local businesses face in such 
a context and how the local private sector can be supported to contribute to local reconstruction, 
development and the strengthening of the peace process at Track II and III levels. 
6.3 Challenges and Opportunities of Local Business Actors in Post-
Conflict Rehabilitation and Peace Promotion 
In the context of Eastern Sri Lanka in 2004/5, the following challenges for local business actors can 
be identified (among others): 
• Since no elections on the provincial level or below have been held in the North and East since 
the war officially ended in December 2001, all government representatives (provincial, district, 
divisional and communal) are appointees. The local authorities are mostly inefficient. They lack 
democratic legitimacy, budgets that go beyond recurrent expenses, and human resources. On 
the other hand, the quasi-parallel “LTTE administrative system” is very authoritarian. (However, 
due to a recent split within the LTTE, their grip on the East had decreased and many of their 
offices seemed to be closed for the moment). Businesses have to face taxation by the LTTE and 
sometimes claim double taxation (by both LTTE and the government). 
• Soft and hard infrastructure, including water, electricity supply, roads, the education and 
vocational training system or medical services, has been badly damaged and/or neglected 
during the war. 
• The conflict has also caused price distortion (but not as strong as for instance in Kosovo), as 
humanitarian and development agencies are paying high salaries and high prices for other 
services. Similarly, people became used to free services, for instance for training. However, 
development agencies are slowly realizing this. Obviously this has created a mentality of 
receiving/expecting rather than delivering/performing among the beneficiaries, whom 
Swisscontact therefore prefers to call “clients”.  
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• A sustainable peace has not yet been reached. Investors are reluctant to place money because 
of the risk of a renewed outbreak of war and because they do not know who will be in control 
in a future administrative system in the North and East. Large-scale investment plans exist, but 
no outsider will invest in the present climate because the risks are perceived as being far too 
high. 
• There are people at all levels who have an interest in keeping the war going – either for 
economic or for political reasons.  
Despite these constraints on the business environment, there are a number of opportunities: 
• If people stand to benefit economically, they are more willing to cooperate with members of 
other communities. Some economic ties have existed throughout and after the armed conflict. 
While these economic ties across different communities potentially strengthen peace, they 
should not be over-estimated as to their effect on the cooperation of communities as a whole, 
since they might only be limited to business interests. These economic links can even be a 
source of conflict when they are perceived as exploitative. For instance, it is often claimed that 
Muslim traders cheat Singhalese or Tamil farmers or fishermen, or that Singhalese fishermen 
(from outside the area) encroach on beaches and fishing grounds in Tamil or Muslim areas and 
destroy their livelihoods. 
• The post-conflict regions represent potentially large new markets for (outside) SMEs and the 
corporate sector. Since many families have at least one member working abroad, there are 
remittance flows to those areas, which should not be underestimated. In Sri Lanka, foreign 
remittances are the single most important foreign exchange earner. A large amount of these 
resources already flow to the conflict-affected areas and is expected to increase if there is a 
sustainable peace. For example, in the absence of investment possibilities in Jaffna, it is 
estimated that every day US$ 500,000 flow to Colombo – mainly into the booming real estate 
market. 
• Linked to the above are the “untapped or under-utilized resources” of the post-conflict areas. If 
put to use again and developed further, they can contribute to employment and income 
generation. For instance, in 2003, Ampara District, heavily affected by the war, was the largest 
paddy producer on the island. There are opportunities in other sectors such as tourism or (re-
)construction. If local resources are put to use and local as well as outside public and private 
investment takes place, this will lead to further job and income opportunities and contribute to 
the diversification of the economy.    
• The flow of relief and development money also represents an opportunity for local businesses to 
participate in the reconstruction of the region. In order to strengthen the local economy and 
create local job-opportunities, private, public and NGOs-initiated reconstruction projects use 
local resources and manpower to the largest extent possible. 
6.4 Promotion of the Local Private Sector in Post-Conflict Situations 
In the context outlined above, what is the role of the local private sector and how and by whom can 
it be strengthened?  
• The business sector (particularly the organized middle-sized firms and the corporate sector 
including multinationals) is the driving force of any economic development. Their primary 
motive is of course to generate profits. By investing in the development of hard and soft 
infrastructure (see below, through PPP with the government), the private sector can contribute 
to offering jobs and income to the local population.  
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• The public sector, on the other hand, should support the business environment by taking care of 
vital infrastructure development such as roads, water and electricity supply, in close 
collaboration with the local private sector. In order to boost economic development, the public 
sector can also provide incentives such as tax exemptions or allocation of government land on 
long-term lease to “early market entrants” and investors in post-conflict areas. Promoting PPP 
is another option, for instance by privatizing former government services (such as utilities). 
• The local society provides the labor force and invests in and develops micro- and small 
businesses on the village level. Services provided by local entrepreneurs, for example in the 
crafts and construction sector, can be used to support local rehabilitation and infrastructure 
development. Eventually, they can become service providers and subcontractors for bigger 
enterprises.  
• A well-trained labor force is a key element in local economic development. In a post-conflict 
situation it is especially important that young people are offered a new perspective in life and 
the chance to a decent way to earn their living. This is a field in which the private sector, the 
state, as well as the development community should work closely together. However, both 
coordination and timing of training efforts should coincide with the reconstruction and 
investment drive. If the trained labor force cannot apply their newly acquired skills, it is likely 
that they engage in unlawful activities and forget what they have learned.  
• Development cooperation can contribute to support both private and public sectors in 
infrastructure development, access to resources, access to information and technology, as well 
as in the development of a strong, employable labor force. Nevertheless, the driving forces 
should be the various local actors and their initiatives.  
All these efforts together will contribute to a more conducive environment in which local businesses 
can prosper. 
6.5 The Current Situation in Eastern Sri Lanka 
The following section examines a project that aims to contribute to peacebuilding by promoting the 
private sector in Eastern Sri Lanka.  
The current situation in this region – the context in which this project was launched – could be 
described as follows: 
• A cease-fire agreement holds, but the situation of “negative peace” is slipping back to a low-
scale warfare, possibly with government and intelligence involvement. The population is caught 
between two factions of the LTTE who combat each other. Mutual suspicion among the 
communities is high, and political and internecine killings occur almost on a daily basis. 
• Hard and soft infrastructure is badly damaged after more than two decades of war. Numerous 
qualified individuals have left the country. 
• The main livelihood resource is agriculture and fisheries. These sectors are recovering, yet 
profits go to middle men (traders). There is a very low degree of industrialization and 
diversification. 
• The many unresolved land disputes are a source of conflict and leave potentially cultivatable 
land resources unused. 
• Unemployment is high, especially among the youth (unemployment stands at around 25 
percent, with underemployment higher than 50 percent). Many are waiting for a chance in the 
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public sector, where job placements are controlled by politicians. A large part of the working 
populations cannot earn a decent living, as their activities do not generate enough income. 
There is a mismatch between the current trainings on offer and the labor force requirements of 
the private sector. Un- and underemployed (male) youth are especially prone to get involved in 
troublesome activities, often linked to armed gangs, alcohol, drugs and crime. If in post-conflict 
situations, these people cannot be absorbed into the labor market, they are bound to become 
spoilers of the local peace process and generate violence. 
6.6 Swisscontact Project in Eastern Sri Lanka 
How does Swisscontact contribute to local economic development in the former conflict zone? 
Swisscontact has two projects in Sri Lanka: The “Development and Peace – Sri Lanka” project 
(DPSL), a mandate by SDC, and the “Swisscontact Development Programme,” which is partially 
funded by SDC. Designed to complement each other, these two projects in the post-conflict Eastern 
District consist of three interventions: 
• Private Sector Promotion aims at improving access to BDS (Business Development Services) for 
local SMEs; creating market linkages for local producers; improving access to business 
information and adequate credit products for SMEs; and working on related issues that support 
a conducive business environment.  
• Unemployed Youth Support (Tamils, Muslims and Singhalese) aims at the improvement of 
sustainable livelihoods through imparting technical (vocational) skills and social skills (such as 
life skills, conflict sensitivity skills, or community and project work with all three ethnicities). 
• Skills Development Provider Strengthening addresses the supply side of training and 
development, i.e., the gap between supply and demand of a trained labor force. It also assumes 
that, once a peaceful settlement is achieved and investment is increasing, a trained labor force 
in potential sectors such as construction, tourism, agriculture/food processing and other services 
will be in demand. 
By combining the efforts of these projects and by linking them with other stakeholders and 
initiatives, Swisscontact hopes to have a quality impact on strengthening the local economy, thereby 
giving fresh opportunities to the people and contributing to peacebuilding at the levels of Track II 
and III. 
6.7 Some Conclusions 
In summary, the following issues can be identified as key elements in development cooperation 
initiatives: It is important to work towards a conducive environment and the abolishment of parallel 
administrative structures. Investment in human resource development is critical, but should coincide 
with (Timing) and respond (Competencies) to rehabilitation efforts and investment drive. Additional 
incentives by the government could have a positive influence on an early investment drive. 
Transparent information channels about the situation, plans and investment opportunities 
complement such efforts. 
Development cooperation can support and promote local initiatives, but should and cannot be the 
driving force. Building local capacity is thus a quintessential aspect of development cooperation. 
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7 Investing in Stability and Sustainability 
Jason Switzer and Mareike Hussels 
The economic drivers behind many contemporary conflicts have received increasing scrutiny in recent 
years. As a consequence, attention has turned to the role of the private sector in conflict zones, and 
to examples of its role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Most research and advocacy efforts 
have focused on the extractive sectors – oil, gas, mining and forestry. Yet comparatively little effort 
has been invested in unpacking the positive and negative relationships between the financial sector 
and conflict prevention, with the exception of efforts to rein in finance for terrorist groups and 
criminal elements.  
In fall 2003, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) brought together leading financial professionals, researchers and 
conflict management and transformation practitioners for an experts’ meeting to discuss these 
issues, identify gaps in understanding, and determine whether further effort was warranted. The 
following points represent the highlights of this discussion and related research.1 
The finance sector can become entangled in conflict scenarios as a consequence of long-standing 
investments or operations in formerly peaceful countries, or through investment in projects whose 
impacts may generate local grievances. Armed groups and conflict entrepreneurs can misuse 
financial services, and the financial sector can be associated with contributing to or failing to 
prevent macroeconomic shocks that weaken the state.  
On the other hand, the financial sector can help to secure peace and manage or prevent conflict 
through its core business, by insuring or mobilizing finance for key infrastructure, energy and water 
services, through ensuring that projects are implemented in a conflict sensitive manner, and through 
spreading the financial impacts of conflict and terrorism over time and space. It can further have a 
positive impact through social investments in communities and protection of natural resources 
critical to their lives and livelihoods; through participation in policy dialogue to promote 
reconciliation, more-accountable governance and protection of human rights; and through 
knowledge sharing with the public sector. The financial sector can create win-win opportunities for 
itself and host societies by mobilizing and managing funds from diaspora communities for post-
conflict reconstruction; by providing innovative services to companies and governments that help to 
predict and prevent conflict and terrorism; and by identifying investment opportunities that have the 
potential to outperform competitors by managing or avoiding conflict-related risks. 
7.1 Reducing Financial Flows that Support Violence 
Financial services are an important element in facilitating corrupt practices and in exchanging 
natural resources, drugs and people for arms. Efforts to reduce these linkages have grown 
substantially since 11 September 2001, through the activities of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), through the adoption of the Wolfsberg Principles by leading institutions, and through 
national legislation such as the US Patriot Act. Because implementing these initiatives poses 
considerable costs to the financial sector – as much as 20 percent of annual profits for Patriot Act 
compliance according to one source – proactive efforts to understand and prevent the misuse of 
financial services for conflict purposes by firms will head off more costly and punitive regulation in 
the future. 
 
______________________ 
1 See also: http://www.iisd.org/publications/publication.asp?pno=636 
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7.2 Reducing Macroeconomic and Local Vulnerability to Shocks 
Countries with a high degree of dependence on commodity exports are vulnerable to international 
commodity price swings with sometimes calamitous results, as illustrated by the link between 
conflict in Rwanda in 1994 and the collapse of international coffee prices. Similarly, communities are 
vulnerable to these price swings and to local-level shocks (e.g. drought, blight, pestilence, refugee 
influx, etc.) The financial sector can contribute to reducing macroeconomic vulnerability through 
assistance in the implementation of national and international revenue stabilization mechanisms 
(e.g. Norway’s petroleum fund and Chile’s copper fund); and to reducing local-level vulnerability and 
strengthening economic diversification through extension of micro insurance and other basic 
financial services, such as bank accounts. In South Africa and Canada, access to financial services 
has recently been endorsed as a basic right for all citizens, yet implementing this for the very poor 
will require considerable innovation. 
7.3 Innovative Products and Services 
Conflict sensitivity can be a new opportunity for competitive advantage, as evidenced by the “peace 
premium” consumers are prepared to pay for Canadian diamonds untainted by allegations of 
conflict complicity. Similarly, it may be possible to target the nearly US$1 billion in annual expatriate 
remittances to conflict zones, with high-risk/reward managed funds that invest productively in these 
regions. 
7.4 Strengthening Post-Conflict Reconstuction 
Private sector investment is most needed during the second half of the decade that follows the 
cessation of hostilities. When international donor funds and attention decline, this will ensure the 
transition from humanitarian assistance to long-term reconstruction. While there is no framework for 
engagement between the financial sector and the donor community (and little mutual 
understanding), such a framework is critically needed. A recent study by MIGA of post-conflict 
Bosnia has revealed that the financial sector is more responsive to political risk insurance from the 
World Bank and other agencies than other sectors, and that such firms are vital to the re-launching 
of local small business development. These small ventures are essential for the regeneration of both 
the economy and society. International support for the restoration of the financial sector may be a 
better value than many other forms of aid, but little is known about effective donor assistance in this 
area. As a first step, it would be worthwhile reviewing the impact of relevant donor projects in this 
sector, while convening a group of international and local financial professionals around the 
question of what it would take on the part of the donor community and the international financial 
institutions to strengthen investment in specific countries in post-conflict settings. 
7.5 Bringing Conflict Sensitivity into Project Finance 
Readily accessible natural resource stocks in Europe and North America are running out and, as a 
result, extractive sector projects are increasingly being developed in regions mired in poverty or 
emerging from decades of protracted violence. Such projects are therefore at increasing risk of 
contributing to tension or turmoil, undermining international security. In one example, a coup 
attempt in Equatorial Guinea has been linked to the discovery of oil. Extractive sector projects in 
impoverished regions are rarely undertaken without direct finance or political risk insurance from 
international financial institutions (IFI) and national export credit agencies (ECA). While important 
initiatives are underway to define benchmarks for conflict sensitive business practices, there is no 
linkage between access to public sources of finance and conflict sensitive project implementation, 
unlike World Bank safeguards and guidelines for resettlement, indigenous communities and 
environmental assessment. One way forward would be to convene the ECAs, IFC and MIGA around 
the definition of a guideline for conflict sensitive project implementation, drawing on available codes 
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and guidelines. This would readily spill over to the private project finance community through the 
Equator Principles, endorsed by banks representing 70 percent of this market, and modeled on the 
World Bank safeguards. 
7.6 Conclusion 
A strong and resilient financial sector is the backbone of a functioning market economy. To be an 
effective actor in preventing conflict and building peace, the aid community must learn how to 
nurture local financial institutions and make international ones more accountable for their actions. 
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